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THE MENS REA PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL
CODE-THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY
Plus a change, plus c'est la mme chose
-Alphonse Karr (1808-1890)1
The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code represents the first systematic
attempt in Ohio criminal law to define and delineate the scope of incs
rea. However, the resulting formulations offer no substantial improve-
ment over current statutes and case law. In writing the proposed code,
the drafters generally followed the framework of the Model Penal Code
but departed from it in many significant ways. A major feature of both
the Model Penal Code and the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code is the crea-
tion of a comprehensive statutory scheme designed to "codify the funda-
mental distinction between criminal misconduct on the one hand, and
innocent conduct . . . on the other."3 As the first step in that endeavor,
the Proposed Criminal Code states that conduct can be criminal only if
it is made so by legislative enactment.4  This represents the first express
legislative codification of the established judicial doctrine that common
law crimes have no legal effect under Ohio law." Though this provision
does not change existing law, it is nonetheless valuable in 'that it removes
any possible doubt as to the intent of the legislature. Thus, the first step
in a consideration of the criminality of an actor's conduct is to determine
whether the legislature has affirmatively prohibited or, in some cases, re-
quired such conduct. Although there is some cost in terms of flexibility
in meeting new situations, the requirement of statutory crimes does ad-
vance two important values: (1) it gives the courts an easily administered
test with which to evaluate conduct; and (2) it provides people with no-
tice of the standards which their conduct must meet.
At the heart of the Proposed Criminal Code is a provision setting forth
the requirements for imposing criminal liability.0 This section codifies
16 LEs Gu PEs 304 (Edition Levy 1849).
2 Final Report of the Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures, PROPOSED OnxO CRIMINAL CODE (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROP. OHIO CIuM.
CODE]. The text of the proposed legislation is incorporated in HousH BILL NUMDIR 511,
109th Ohio General Assembly (1971) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 511].
3 PROP. OIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.21, Committee Comments at 38.
4Id. § 2901.03(A): "No conduct constitutes a criminal offense against the state unless it
is defined as an offense in the Revised Code."
6 In Winn v. Ohio, 10 Ohio 345 (1841), the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that "with
us it has always been a maxim .... that the whole course of procedure relative to crimes .
should be the subject of legislative enactment." Id. at 347. In Vanvalkenburg v. Ohio, 11
Ohio 405 (1842), the court stated that "[w]ith us there is no such thing as common.law
crimes." Id. at 406. See also Ohio v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 490, 110 N.E.2d 416 (1953);
Eastman v. Ohio, 131 Ohio St. 1, 1 N.E.2d 140 (1936); Municipal Court of Toledo v. State C.x
rel. Platter, 126 Ohio St. 103, 184 N.E. 1 (1933).
6 PRop. 01O CRIM. CODE § 2901.21.
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the view expressed in the common law maxim: "actus non facit reurn,
nisi mens sit red--an act is not culpable (punishable) unless the mind
which inspired the act is also guilty.7 Therefore, before liability may
justly be imposed, two elements must coalesce: (1) the "material" ele-
ment of a guilty or prohibited act (actus reus); and (2) the "formal"
element of a guilty mind (mens rea).8 In essence, the actus rezis require-
ment consists of either a voluntary act? (other than a reflexive or convul-
sive act) where the law prohibits conduct or a voluntary omission where
the law imposes a duty to act (but only where the accused is physically
capable of acting).1 The concept of actus rets is not particularly trou-
blesome since in most cases it is simply a question of fact whether the
prohibited conduct has occurred (or a failure to perform a required act)
and whether it is the accused who has engaged in that conduct."
Alens rea, on the other hand, is a much more ephemeral concept and
one which has raised many difficult questions. For most crimes, Ohio
currently follows the established rule of Anglo-American jurisprudence
that a guilty mind which must be both pleaded and proved is an essential
element of statutory crimes.' 2  While there has been little argument on
this point in Ohio decisions, there has been substantial disagreement over
the definition of the required mens rea. This comment will examine
the mens rea definitions in the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code and will
consider what problems those definitions may represent in their present
form. To this end, the definitions will be compared with the parallel pro-
visions in the Model Penal Code on which they were based and the signif-
icance of the differences between the formulations will be noted. Addi-
tionally, the proposals will be compared with other recent codes, both
enacted and proposed, which are also based on the Model Penal Code.
The experience of two of the states which have enacted such codes will
be noted to determine possible implications in the future of Ohio mens
rea law.
7 3 E. CoKE, INSTITuTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 107 (1641) [hereinafier cited as
COKE].
8 J. SALmOND, JURISPRUDENCE 380 (9th ed. 1937).
9 PROP. OHIo CRIML. CODE § 2901.21(A)(1).
'°Additionally, the proposed statute expressly classes as involuntary acts body move-
ments during "sleep or unconsciousness." Id. § 2901.21(C)(2).
"Bat see G. WIUJAws, THE MENTAL ELEmENT iN CRIME, 17-18 (1965); Note, Hypno-
tism and the Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1509 (1961).
12 State v. Cameron, 91 Ohio Sr. 50, 109 N.E. 584 (1914); Licciardi v. State, 18 Ohio
App. 118 (1914); Bissman v. State, 6 Ohio C. Dec. 712 (Ct App. 1895), aVJd, 54 Ohio Sr.
242, 43 N.E. 164 (1896). But see Columbus v. Webster, 170 Ohio Sr. 327, 164 N.E.2d 734(1960); State v. Healy (Ct App.), 95 N.E.2d 244, rcv'd, 156 Ohio St. 229, 102 N.E.2d 233
(1950).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENS RIEA UNDER THE
COMMON LAW
To better understand the position of Ohio mens tea law, it will be in-
structive to briefly look at the history of mens rea under the common
law.13 American criminal law is at least the step-child, if not the child, of
English law. Therefore, the history of development of the doctrine of
mens rea under the common law is relevant to a consideration of the par-
allel doctrine under American law. 'While culpability has always occupied
a central place in American criminal jurisprudence, the concept had a
rather late development in English law-the first systematic treatment not
appearing until the middle of the eighteenth century."' However, it would
be an oversimplification to suggest, as some have,1 that prior to this time
the common law was unconcerned with culpability.'" At any rate, it is
clear that in its earliest stages Anglo-Saxon law was not concerned with
abstract theories of blameworthiness.
Criminal law arose out of the "blood feud" in which families sought
personal vengeance for injuries ,to one of their members.11 The English
kings, sensing the danger to the stability of society which such feuds
threatened, sought to convince these families to take their grievances be-
fore the courts. The early criminal law concerned itself largely with those
offenses which were likely to provoke vengeance, and those were largely
deliberate or intentional wrongs. 18 Since even vengeance demands blame-
worthy victims, it was only natural that the core of a concept of moral
guilt existed in early crimes. Statutes from this era indicate that a definite,
albeit largely undeveloped, distinction was drawn between intentional and
inadvertent harms.' However, concepts of justice were not yet sophisti-
cated enough to draw fine distinctions of guilt.20 Therefore, in all but
13 For a general discussion of the history of mens rea in Anglo-American law, see J.
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 77-83 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as
HALL]; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) [herein.
after cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND]; T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF TH= COM-
MON LAw (4th ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as PLUCKNEIrT; Say re, Mns Rea, 45 HARv, L.
REV. 974 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Sayre]).
14 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRoWN 14 (1736).
15See, e.g., Remington & Helstad, The Mental Element in Crime-A Legislativa P'ob-
lem, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 644.
10 See, e.g., Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L. Q REv, 37, 42 (1926).
17 Sayre, supra note 13, at 975.
18 0. HOLMES, Tim COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
19 E.g. 6 Aethelred, c. 52, 1 (ca. 1000) : "And if it happens that a man commits a mis.
deed, involuntarily or unintentionally,... he ... should always be entitled to, .. better terms.
. ." A. ROBERTSON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY 1
107 (1925). See also 2 Canute, c. 68, § 3 (ca. 1027): "[l]f anyone does anything uninten-
tionally, the case is entirely different from that of one who acts deliberately." A. ROBERT-
SON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY I 209 (1925).
20 Sayre, supra note 13, at 976. It should be noted that at this time the distinction be-
tween criminal and civil law had not yet developed. Recompense to one who was wronged
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the clearest cases of inadvertence, such considerations only acted to miti-
gate the harsh penalties then provided for crimes.2 1
With the coming of the Normans, English law underwent great
changes. One of the outstanding characteristics of Norman society was
an attention to detail and systematic methods of administration? Thus,
one of the first projects of the Norman kings was to draw together the
tangled strains of English law into rough "codes." Included in the first
of these codes, the Leges Henrici Prhmi,23 was the maxim that "whoever
commits evil unknowingly must pay for it knowingly."2 4  Despite the ap-
parent rigidity of this rule, it should be regarded as the result of deciding
cases on an ad hoc basis with no unifying legal theory rather than a codi-
fication of strict criminal liability. There were, however, some crimes,
such as homicide, which were commonly treated in a fashion approaching
strict liability-even if committed by accident or in self-defense.2 The
harsh penalties, though, were later mitigated in such cases by the "king's
pardon." After conviction, the inadvertent offender could petition the
king for clemency. 28
By the end of the thirteenth century, the effects of two powerful new
influences began to appear in English law. First, there was the rise of the
great universities with the concomitant revival of ancient Roman writers
and law. Scholars eagerly took up concepts of revival, especially those of
dolus (wrong) and culpa (guilt). 27  Second, the rise of church power
also had an effect on criminal law. It was the canon law's emphasis on
moral guilt which really gave the impetus for the &levelopment of a theory
of mens rea.28  The influence of church writers may be dearly seen in
the thirteenth century writings of Bracton. For example, Bracton divides
homicides into "spiritual" and "corporeal" varieties.-'? The concept of
consisted of a payment of money which formed the basis for later civil damages and the criminal
fine. Id. at 976-77.
212 POLLOCK & AInTLAND, supra note 13, at 470. Sca also Hall, supra note 13, at 78.
2 2 PLUCKNTET, supra note 13, at 11.
23 1 POLLOCK & MArr.Arn, supra note 13, at 99-101.
2 4 LEGES Hm, ICI PnMir, r- 88, § 6 (1100): "[Q]ui inscienter peccat, rcienter emendat."
25 Sayre, supra note 13, at 979-80.
261d. at 980. See also Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. L c. 9 (1278), which provides
that in cases of homicide by misadventure, the king should be informed and he could then grant
a pardon "if it pleased him." 2 POLLACK & MArrLAND, supra note 13, at 481.
27 See Bodenstein, Phases in the Development of Criminal Afens Rca, 36 So. AmI cAN
L J. 323, 327-33 (1919).
28-Remington & Helstad, supra note 15, at 648. An example of canonist thinking may h2
seen in Mark 7:20-23:
[Wihat comes out of a man is what defiles a man. For from within, out of the
heart of man, come evil thoughts, fornication, theft, murder, adultery, coveting,
wickedness, deceit, licentiousness, envy, pride, foolishness. All of these evil things
come from within, and they defile a man.
29 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 477: Bracton drew his theory from Bernard
of Pavia, a noted cleric of that time.
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"spiritual homicide" reflects the canonist's view that one was guilty of crime
if he merely desired the prohibited result without any overt act.80 Brac-
ton divided corporeal homicide (one actually committed) into those com-
mitted (1) by "justice" (as when a condemned felon was justly executed
by a judicial officer, (2) by necessity, (3) by misadventure, and (4) by
desire (intentional).31 The absence of a similar treatment of mens rea in
other contemporary accounts suggests that perhaps Bracton, who was in-
fluenced by the canonists, overstated the importance of the mental ele-
ment in the law of his time.32
Although Bracton may have overstated the necessity for a guilty mind
in thirteenth century law, his writings marked a major advance in the de-
velopment of a mens rea theory. Bracton was the first English jurist to
set forth all the elements needed for a theory of culpability, although he
failed to systematically develop those elements or to delineate their role
in criminal law. Bracton's concept of mens rea amiounted to little more
than an undifferentiated concept of moral blameworthiness.3 Later, jur-
ists and commentators refined that nascent idea until the first complete
theory of moral culpability appeared in the eighteenth century writings of
Hale.34 Between Bracton and Hale there was a gradual shift from the
more primitive concept of a blameworthy actor to the more abstract con-
cept of an actor's specific intent to effect a blameworthy result 8  The ex-
tent to which that shift had progressed by the eighteenth century may be
seen in Hale's discussion of homicide by "casualty and misfortune" where
he stated the following principle:
[A]s to criminal proceedings, if the act that is committed be simply casu-
al ... , regularly that act, which were it done out of a spirit of intention,
were punishable with death, is not by the laws of England to undergo that
punishment; for it is the will and intention, that regularly is required, as
well as the act and even, to make the offense capital.30
Although legal commentators from the time of Bracton focused on
the mental element in crime, there is in their writings a failure to isolate
basic concepts.3" Besides the guilty mind, there is a second mental ele-
S0 PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 289.
312 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUs ANGLIAE 340 (Thorne Translation
1968).32 Bracdon is "an untrustworthy guide to the legal notions of his English contemporaries
whenever he ventures beyond a mere description of what, as a matter of fact, was done in courts
of law." 1 F. MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 314 (1911).
33 Sayre, supra note 13, at 988.
3 4 See, e.g., 1 HALE, supra note 14, at 15: "[WJhere there is ro will to commit an offense,
there can be no ... just reason to incur the penalty .... ' '
S5 See Sayre, supra note 13, at 988-94. See also COKE, supra note 7, at 6: "Acts non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea."
36 1 HALE, supra note 14, at 38.
37See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART § 8 (2d ed. 1961). Sea also
HALL, supra note 13, at 104.
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ment in crime-the voluntariness of the act. These writers did not
treat volition in great depth when discussing the culpability of an act be-
cause the prevailing philosophical thought put great emphasis on the neces-
sity of free will. It was the exercise of free will that gave actions their
moral character. Thus, an act was blameworthy because the actor freely
chose to do evil rather than good. By ignoring the difference between
freely acting and desiring that a prohibited result should occur, part of
the actus r'eus element was grafted onto the mens rea.
Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth century, set forth a classification
of mens rea defenses as they existed in his time. Blackstone divided these
defenses into three categories. The first of these, comprised of the acts
arising from the actor's "defect of understanding, '"3 exculpates in cases
of insanity,"9 infancy,40 and involuntary intoxication.-" The rationale un-
derlying these defenses is that the actor is under a disability to such an ex-
tent that he is unable to exercise his free will, despite the fact that such an
actor could very well have desired the prohibited result. The third of
Blackstone's categories ("where the action is constrained by some outward
force and violence") comprises the defenses equivalent to modern duress,
coercion, and necessity.42 Again, the underlying rationale is that an actor
who cannot freely choose to do evil should not be culpable. Only the sec-
ond of the categories describes a technical mens rea defense ("where a
man commits an unlawful act by misfortune or chance").+3 These are the
defenses corresponding to the modern defenses of accident, mistake of law,
and mistake of fact. The defense of mistake, either of law or of fact,
covers the situation in which someone acts voluntarily, erroneously believ-
ing that his conduct is lawful.44
38 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMiMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 021 (1857). [Herein-
after cited as BLACKSTONE].
39 See A'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 3 Eng. Rep. 713 (House of Lords 1843).
4 0 At common law, there was a conclusive presumption that a child under the age of
seven could not have a guilty mind. Between the ages of seven and 14, there was a rebut-
table presumption of lack of capacity, 1 HALE, stupra note 14, at 25. Ohio currently follows
the common law nile. Under the Proposed Criminal Code, since there is no provision
dealing with the defense, the common law rule will presumably continue to be applied in
Ohio.
41 At common law, this defense applied only to cases of involuntary intoxication. When
the drinker freely chose to become intoxicated, acts committed while under the influence of
the intoxicant were felt not to merit the same treatment as acts committed while naturally
unconscious or asleep. HALL, supra note 13, at 530. SCO aso, PROP. OHIO CPIZL CODE §
2901.35 (the defense of intoxication). But see PROP. OHIO CEML CODE § 2901.35 (B) (as
amended in SUBSTTUTE HOUSE BILL NUMBER 511) [hereinafter cited as SuB. H.B. 511],
which effectively removes the defense in many cases: "Involuntary intoxication is not a defense
to any offense of which an element is operation of a motor vehicle ... or of which an element
is carrying or using any firearm or dangerous ordnance .... " Voluntary intoxication may, how-
ever, serve to negate the existence of a true culpable mental state in some cases. See, e.g., WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 37, §§ 182-83.
42 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *21.
43 Id. at *21, *27.
4 4 The classical formulation on this point is Levott's case, discussed in Cook's case, 79
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The fact that the common law treated all of these defenses as going to
the mens rea element of an offense has effected American criminal law.
During the colonial period, the settlers brought with them the common
law including the criminal law doctrine of mens rea. The writings of
major English commentators, such as Hale, Blackstone, and Coke, became
available to American lawyers during the eighteenth century. In fact,
due to the difficulty in communicating with England, these treatises be-
came the major reference works for early American criminal law. The
failure to dearly distinguish between basic mens tea concepts which had
entered English law over the course of five centuries became a part of
American law at its inception. Although later theorists have been more
analytical,46 most courts and legislatures continue to reveal a basic confu-
sion.
Ohio mens rea law represents a typical case of that confusion. In ad-
dition to the difficulties inherent in the concept itself, the situation has
been aggravated by the inability or unwillingness of the General Assembly
to come to grips with problems concerning mens rea. The legislature has
continued to write culpability elements into its statutes but has not de-
veloped a systematic mode of dealing with them. This failure is evidenced
by the bewildering number of terms which have been used to express tie
mental requirement for offenses.47 However, the legislature has never de-
fined these terms nor has it ever explained why different terms appear in
different statutes. Thus, Ohio courts have been forced to interpret statutes
without legislative guidance. This situation has led to uncertainty as to
how mens rea should be applied by both trial and appellate courts. There-
fore, the fact that the drafters have included basic culpability provisions
as an integral part of the statutory scheme of the Proposed Criminal Code
represents a great potential for improving Ohio mens rea law.48
Eng. Rep. 1063 (KB. 1638). In this case, a prosecution for murder, the court acquitted a
man who killed his servant's friend whom the defendant erroneously, but reasonably, thought
to be a burglar. The court felt that the defendant was guiltless since he had not intended to
commit murder. Id. at 1064. See also 1 HALE, supra note 14, at 42, 474.
45 Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Contitutional Guaranty of Trial
by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 967 (1925).
46See, e.g., G. WILLiAMs, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME (1965).
47 E.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954) (first degree murder) (purposely,
and either of deliberate and premeditated malice); Id. § 2901.04 (taking the life of a police
officer) (purposely and willfully); Id. § 2901.05 (second degrce murder) (purposely and
maliciously); Id. § 2901.39 (threatening letters) (knowingly send a . . . writing for the pur.
pose of extorting money . . . or containing willful and malicious threats . . . or knowingly
send any paper . .. intended to simulate a summons . . . with ivtent to obtain money); Id.§ 2901.40 (abandonment of destitute, infirm, or aged parent) (neglect or refuse); Id. §
2905.27 (keeping a place for prostitution) (with knowledge or reasonable cause to know that
the purpose); Id. § 2917.01 (bribery) (corruptly give); Id. § 2923.14 (assemblage for teach.
ing criminal syndicalism) (voluntarily participate); Id. § 2923.3D (false statement affecting
the solvency of a bank) (willfully and knowingly); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.56 (Page
Supp. 1971) (persons prohibited from obtaining or having firearms) (knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe) (emphasis supplied).
48 See note 6 supra and accompanying discussion.
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In creating a new criminal code, the legislators have the unique oppor-
tunity to sweep away nearly two centuries of legislative inaction and judi-
cial groping. Because there is a great need for clarification, it is unfor-
tunate that the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code culpability provisions have
failed to seize that opportunity. While there has been an attempt to de-
fine culpability in a more rational fashion, any benefit which might have
been achieved has been nullified by imprecise draftsmanship and vague
definitions of already unclear terms. 9 Furthermore, the proposals will add
new confusion by introducing concepts which have no analogues in cur-
rent law and which the Proposed Code has not clearly defined.W The prac-
tical result (absent amendment of the present form) will be to inject
greater doubt into the minds of the criminal bench and bar than currently
exists. Since culpability is the "keystone" of the Proposed Ohio Criminal
Code," ' it is necessary to examine the culpability provisions separately.
II. THE Afens Rea DEFINITIONS OF THE
PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE
One of the dominant themes in recent American criminal law is the
movement to reform the patchwork of criminal statutes with a systema-
tic, integrated codification analogous to the Uniform Commercial Code.
One particularly outstanding example of this effort is the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code.52 The Code, which represents the collabo-
ration of numerous legal scholars and jurists, was developed to provide
state legislators with a comprehensive model to aid them in drafting their
own revisions. The drafters of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code have
drawn heavily from the Model Penal Code in constructing their proposals
for Ohio.r  One of the chief features of the Model Penal Code is the
grounding of liability on a bipartite concept of criminality-a voluntary
act coupled with a specific guilty mental state.54 As noted previously, this
framework was adopted for the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code and has
been made the basic operative section of its statutory scheme.
The adoption of this scheme represents an improvement for Ohio be-
cause it clears up the present conflict in judicial doctrine. In State v. Huff-
man,5" the Ohio Supreme Court laid down a rigid rule that the requisites
for liability must be stated in the statute defining an offense-due to the
4 9 E.g., PROp. OHIO CamI. CODE § 2901.22(A) states that a person "acts purposely when
it is his specific intention to cause a certain result .... " (emphasis supplied).
5 0 See, e.g., PROP. OHIO CaM. CODE § 2901.22(D) ("negligence").
5 1 PROP. OHmO CaMI. CODE § 2901.21, Committee Comments at 38.
52 MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter cited as M.P.C.
(P.O.D.)].
53 See PROP. OHIO CalML CODE, Committee Comments at viii.
54 ALP.C. § 2.01(1) (P.O.D.).
55 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936).
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lack of common law crimes in Ohio law. If, however, the statute is silent
regarding the mens rea element, then culpability is not made a part of the
offense.5 6 While the Huffman rule has been applied in some later cases, 7
its harshness has caused some other courts to retreat from a full application.
For example, in State v. Weisberg,58 the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga
County qualified the rule by holding that although the legislature has the
power to criminalize behavior without regard to the mental state of the
actor, the mere silence of the statute does not of itself eliminate mens reet.
This view was expanded by State v. Euclid Fish Co., 9 in which the court
agreed with the Weisberg holding and added the further limitation that
unless the language of the statute dearly indicates a legislative intent to
eliminate culpability, it will be concluded that culpability must be proved."
The confusion that has been engendered by the conflict in these decisions
will be eliminated by the inclusion in the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code
of a general rule for determining legislative intent regarding proof of
mens rea. The Proposed Code codifies the Euclid rule by providing that
only when a statute "plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal
liability" is culpability not an element of an offense.c", If there is no stated
mens rea requirement and the statute does not clearly indicate strict liabil-
ity, then the prosecution must prove mens ea2
Culpability is defined under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code as "pur-
pose, knowledge, recklessness or negligence."6 3  Each of these terms is
given a statutory meaning which is to be applied whenever one of them
is specified in a statute defining an offense. The format follows the
Model Penal Code pattern of four hierarchically arranged levels of cul-
pability, the definitions of which are also patterned on those in the Model
Penal Code. However, the definitions of culpability in the Proposed Ohio
Criminal Code differ in several significant respects from the model on which
they are based. The proposed definitions, when compared to the parallel
provisions in the Model Penal Code, reduce each level of culpability one
degree. For example, "knowledge" under the Proposed Ohio Criminal
56Id. at 32, 1 N.E.2d at 315.
57 See, e.g., State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 176 Ohio St. 482, 200 N.E.2d 590 (1964);
State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 102 N.E.2d 233 (1951); Point Cafe, Inc. v. Board of
Liquor Control, 168 N.E.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1960); Hanewald v. Board of Liquor Control,
101 Ohio App. 375, 136 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
58 74 Ohio App. 91, 55 N.X.2d 870 (1943).
59 198 N.E.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1964).
o Id. at 778:
It is true that certain conduct may be defined as criminal %hich does not include
the element of guilty knowledge .... But unless it is made clearly to appear that
the legislature did not intend to require guilty knowledge in defining a crime, the
courts will conclude that guilty knowledge was intended.
61 PROP. OHIo CRIM. CODE § 2901.22(E).
82 Id. The level required to be proved in such cases is "recklessness."
83 d. § 2901.21(C)(3).
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Code° is defined in a way which is closest to Model Penal Code "reck-
lessness."65 Ohio Code "recklessness" 6 is equivalent to Model Penal Code
"negligence."' 7  The reason for this reduction is not dear but may repre-
sent either carelessness with words or a conscious desire to broaden the
area susceptible to criminal sanctions by making it easier to establish the
requisite mental element. While it is true that there is nothing sacred
about the Model Penal Code definitions, it is nonetheless instructive to see
how sharply the proposed formulations differ from those in the Model
Penal Code.
A. Purpose
Under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code, the highest degree of culpa-
bility is "purpose."' 8  Under current Ohio law, the terms "intent," "pur-
pose," and "knowledge" are used commonly to express this level of culpa-
bility. One of the problems of the current law is the absence of a legisla-
tive statement of the relationship between these terms. As a result, the
courts have expressed some confusion in dealing with these terms. This
confusion may be traced to primarily two factors: (1) no Ohio statute
has ever defined any of these terms; and (2) the terms have been applied
interchangeably to crimes of widely disparate degrees of severity."2 The
usual practice of referring to the common law whenever the legislature's
intent is not dear has been of only limited help in this area because the
common law was also confused about mens rea. Ohio courts have made
what are essentially intuitive judgments of what level of culpability is
needed to establish a particular crime, and those judgments, although ex-
pressed in the same words, have varied roughly according to the perceived
seriousness of the offense charged. Thus, when the facts showed a par-
ticularly offensive type of conduct, the courts struggled to find the re-
quisite intent." However, when the offense was not so shocking, courts
have tended to place more emphasis on the presence of a true intent.'
In drafting the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute avoided
the use of "intent" due to the vagueness resulting from various judicial
6 4 PROP. OHIo CRmi. CoDE § 2901.22(B). See note 168 in ra.
656 K.C. § 2.02(2)(c) (P.O.D.). See note 179 infra.
6 8 PRop. OmiO GE CODE § 2901.22(C). See note 187 infra.
67M.P.C. § 2.02(2)(d) (P.O.D.).
68 PRop. OHio Can&. CODE § 2901.22(A):
A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result, or,
when the gravamen of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain na-
ture, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific
intention to engage in conduct of that nature.
69 CoMrpare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954) (first degree murder), wutb
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.15 (Page 1954) (taking a bicycle with intent to use it).
70See, e.g., State v. Salter, 149 Ohio St. 264, 78 N.E,2d 575 (1948).
71 See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 91 Ohio St. 50, 109 N.. 584 (1914).
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interpretations.7 ' Further, since "purpose" had not been so commonly
used in statutes, the Institute thought that fewer problems would be car-
ried over from questionable past interpretations. For this reason, and be-
cause it corresponds with commonsense usage, "purpose" could be given
a standard meaning for purposes of the Code. Apparently, the drafters
of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code agreed with this position and
adopted the same term. Although the Technical Committee had suggested
the alternative of adopting for Ohio the Model Penal Code definition of
purpose verbatim,73 it later decided to develop a version expressing the
essence of the Model Penal Code provision in different words.7 4 It is not
dear from the legislative history what happened or why, but when the
final version was reported to the legislature, a substantial change had been
made in the wording of the "purpose" definition.
In the Model Penal Code it is provided that "[a] person acts pur-
posely ...when ...it is his conscious object to engage in (prohibited]
conduct ...."' In the proposed Ohio definition, the standard was changed
from "conscious object" to "specific intent.' 70  While it is arguable that
the two phrases are synonomous, there is more to be considered. Although
-starting with the basic purpose to clear up the confusion which currently
characterizes Ohio mens tea law, the new standard for conduct created to
serve that purpose has been defined in terms of the phrase which gave
rise to much of the problem in the first instance. In the House of Repre-
sentatives, many sections of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code were
amended extensively. The only change made in the "purpose" definition,
however, was the substitution of "gist" for "gravamen. ' '7 The House left
the "specific intent" language intact. If the language is not changed by the
Senate, it will result in no change in the current confused law of intent.
Therefore, the courts again will be forced to grapple with the same vague,
undefined concept absent substantive legislative guidance.
By following the Model Penal Code format, the Proposed Ohio Crim-
inal Code made a more subtle change in the Ohio mens tea law than the
72 M.P.C. § 2.02, Comment at 124 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
73 The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft no.
8 at 7 (July 12, 1966).
74 The Technical Committee suggested that while the Model Penal Code requirement
of a specific mental state for each material element of an offense should be followed, the
language used by the Model Penal Code was confusing. Therefore, it was suggested that
"purpose" and "knowledge" be defined in different words but that those words should make It
clear that the mental state pertains to each element. Id.
75 M.P.C. § 2.02(2)(a) (P.O.D.).
76See note 68 supra.
77 PROP. OIO CRM. CODE § 2901.22(A) (as amended in Su. H.B. 511): "A person acts
purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain re,,.ult, or, when the gist of the
offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature . . . it is his specific intention to




mere substitution of a new term for the old "intent" standard. Under
current Ohio law, the judicial consensus is that the terms "purpose,""in-
tent," and "knowledge" are more or less interchangeable and describe
approximately the same level of culpability. Under the Proposed Crimi-
nal Code, however, there is a narrow distinction between purpose ("spe-
cific intent") on the one hand and knowledge on the other. Under cur-
rent law, though, there seems to be only a choice between "intent," and the
lack of intent. However, although the same word is used, the intent
required for murder seems to be conceptually different from the intent
required for a lesser crime. Frequently, the existence of a "guilty mind"
of any level is referred to in judicial opinions by the general term "sci-
enter.""8 Since Ohio law has only used an intent standard, it has become
common for judges to draw a distinction between "general intent" and
"specific intent."79  General intent is a design without a particular object
and is usually referred to in the context of lesser crimes.80 Specific in-
tent, on the other hand, refers to the desire of the actor to accomplish
the particular result which did in fact occur. General intent is often re-
garded as the general propensity to commit a crime, while specific intent
relates to a more particular proscribed result. Ohio courts appear to have
distinguished general and specific intent, often without explicit acknowl-
edgement that they were doing so. This distinction appears to be the rea-
son that "purpose" under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code is defined in
terms of "specific intent."
When considering the impact of the proposed definition of "purpose,"
it should be noted that there is only a narrow and somewhat artificial
distinction between crimes requiring proof of "purpose" and those for
which proof of "knowledge" is sufficient. For most crimes under the
Proposed Criminal Code, the fact that an actor knew of the nature of
his conduct or the results flowing from such conduct should be enough to
establish liability. However, there are some crimes for which American
criminal law has traditionaly required a higher degree of culpability than
knowledge. These are the crimes in which it has been the practice under
current law to talk of "specific intent." Crimes of this nature fall into
roughly two categories. First, there is the class of crimes which corres-
ponds to the common law actus malum in se-an act which is bad in and
of itself."' These are the offenses which have been regarded as posing
the greatest threat to the established order. They were classed as felonies
at common law and carried the harshest penalties. Examples of such
crimes from the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code are capital murder52 (cor-
7 8 See, e.g., Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230,238 (1837).
7 9 See, e.g., State v. Guerrieri, 20 Ohio App. 2d 132, 252 N.E.2d 179 (1969).
8O See, e.g., State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 102 N.E.2d 233 (1951) ("larceny by trick").
81 These were the crimes that were designated as felonies at common law.
s- PRop. Onto CrIM. CODE § 2903.01.
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responding to murder in the first degree under current law 3), rape,8' and
child stealings5 (kidnapping of a child). The other major class of crimes
which require proof of purpose are those which are not inherently de-
structive of society but represent highly provocative affronts to the pre-
vailing social mores, such as voyeurism,( desecration (of a flag, cemetery,
etc.) ,87 and torture of animals.88  While the penalties for such offenses
are generally less harsh than for crimes that are "bad in and of them-
selves," conviction for one of them is likely to carry with it significant
social opprobrium. Thus, before criminal sanctions may be imposed for
any of these offenses, fairness requires proof that the actor had the con-
scious object of engaging in the conduct or causing the prohibited result.
The hallmark of a purposeful crime is either, in the words of the Model
Penal Code, a "conscious object" or, in the words of the Proposed Criminal
Code, a "specific intent." The Proposed Criminal Code carries over from
current law a distinction between two general classes of purposeful crimes:
(1) those in which the result of unspecified conduct is prohibited (for
example, "causing the death of another"' 9); and (2) those in which a
type of conduct itself is prohibited regardless of the results which may
flow from it (for example, "tampering with coin machines"9 0). In both
cases, there must be proof that the accused had the specific objective of
engaging in the prohibited act.
The first judicial recognition that culpability was a requirement of Ohio
criminal law appears to be the 1836 decision in Anderson v,. State."' The
defendant in that case had been charged with "aiding in passing a forged
certificate of deposit." The statute under which he was charged contained
no reference to a mens rea element. In reversing the conviction, the Ohio
Supreme Court stated that intention was a requisite element of the of-
fense even though the statute did not provide for it. There is no express
reference in the case to the common law requirement of mens rea. Rather,
the decision seems to have been based on general concepts of fairnessY3
This case also represents the first time that the court discussed the rela-
8 3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954).
84 PROP. OHIO CaMI. CODE § 2907.02.
851d. § 2905.04.
8G1d. § 2907.07.
87 Id. § 2923.51.
88 d. § 2923.31.
89E .g., PROP. OHIO CRiM. CODE §§ 2903.01 (capital murder) and 2903.02 (murder).
90PROP,. OHIO CRaM. CODE § 2911.22.
91 7 Ohio 539 (1836).
921d. at 544:
It is the intention that gives character to the action, and makes that criminal which
would otherwise be exempt from guilt.
The statute does not attach criminality to one, who, in honesty and good faith, be.
comes instrumental in passing off a forged paper.
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tionship of knowledge to intention: "There can be no intention without
knowledge." The rule in Anderson was reaffirmed the next year in
Birney v. State, 4 which involved a prosecution under the fugitive slave
laws. The defendant had been convicted of harboring a fugitive slave un-
der a statute which did not require knowledge that the person harbored
was a fugitive. In overturning the conviction, Justice Wood, who had also
decided Anderson, stated: "We know of no case where positive action
is held criminal, unless the intention accompanies the act, either expressly,
or necessarily inferred from the act itself."' 5 Thus, the court drew a dis-
tinction between the statutory equivalent of common law felonies which
inherently involved intentional acts and the dass of crimes such as har-
boring a fugitive slave which, "independent of positive enactment, in-
volve[dl no moral wrong."" In the former situation, intention could be
inferred from the doing of the act itself, but in the latter, guilty knowledge
was an element which must be pleaded and proved.
Anderson points up the difficulty which has greatly contributed to the
confusion which afflicts men rea law. Since intention by definition is a
subjective concept, absent a confession or admission there is no way to
prove directly its existence. The Birney court stated that intent could be
"inferred" from certain types of acts, an inelegant way of stating the ac-
cepted rule that intent is to be determined by looking at all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the act. On the other hand, if Justice Wood
actually meant that intent could be inferred solely from the fact that the
accused had committed the act, he stated too broad a rule and one which
has since been rejected.97
While many courts have paid lip service to the rule that intent is a
required element of crimes, the determinations of what constitutes that
intent have taken some bizarre turns. The recent case of State v. Butler9
illustrates the extent to which some courts have gone to find intent. Butler
involved a prosecution for second degree murder for the death of a motor-
ist who was killed when his car was struck by that of defendant Butler.
Butler and a companion, Anderson, at the time of the accident, were en-
gaged in a "drag race." While Butler was trying to pass Anderson's
car, Butler's car struck the victim's car and killed the driver. The court of
appeals upheld the conviction and found that all elements of the charge
had been proven.99 Second degree murder requires proof of (1) an in-
93 Id.
94 8 Ohio 230 (1837).
95 Id. at 238.
96 Id.
9 7 E.g., State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 43, 1 N.E.2d 313, 320 (1936). But ree State
v. Swiger, 5 Ohio S. 2d 151, 157, 214 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1966).
9S6 Ohio App. 2d 193, 217 N.E.2d 237 (1966).
991d. at 197, 217 N.E.2d at 241.
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tent and purpose to kill; and (2) malice.100 The court reached this result
by starting with the basic premise that a man may be held to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts. Since the de-
fendants had voluntarily and intentionally engaged in the drag race, their
act was "voluntary." Furthermore, since they weie "operating their cars
with such reckless, willful and intentional violation of traffic laws,"' '
death was a natural and probable consequence of their conduct. Thus,
they could be held to have intended the death which ensued. Next, second
degree murder requires proof of "malice." Malice is a highly technical
word of art in Ohio criminal law and, if it means anything, means that
there was no justification or legal excuse for the act.'02 The court said
that "[w]here the fact of killing, with intent and purpose to kill, is proved,
malice is to be presumed."'' 03  This case illustrates the danger which accom-
panies the indiscriminate use of "presumptions" and overly broad defini-
tions of intent. Under such a rationale, almost any act of recklessness
could be regarded as intentional.
On appeal, however, the Ohio Supreme Court,'04 rejected the reason-
ing of the court of appeals and stated that the "purpose to kill" required
by the statute
must be present in the mind of the slayer at the time and place of the
killing. Further, the act of killing must be preformed to carry out or exe-
cute the intent or purpose to kill. The killing must result from the de-
sign, purpose or intent of the slayer .... 105
Thus, the evidence in this case did not prove the element of intent or pur-
pose to kill. While the supreme court struck down the conclusion of the
court of appeals, its decision demonstrates one of the chief sources of the
confusion which characterizes Ohio mens tea law: Butler upheld the valid-
ity of the rule that a man may be presumed to have intended the natural
and probable consequences of his voluntary acts.'"' The ways in which
this presumption has been applied have added much of the current un-
certainty.
The presumption of intent expressed in Butler has long been used in
Ohio criminal law.' It was developed under the common law in response
to the need to prove guilty intent and later became part of Ohio law. It
is difficult to prove subjective intent and as this presumption has been ap-
plied in Ohio there has been a cost in terms both of the clarity of mens
100 O1O REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (Page 1954).
1016 Ohio App. 2d at 197, 217 N.E.2d at 241.
10 2 Davis v. State, 25 Ohio St. 369 (1874); Allison v. State, 1.2 Ohio App. 217 (1919).
103 6 Ohio App. 2d at 197, 217 N.E.2d at 241.
104 State v. Butler, 11 Ohio St. 2d 23, 227 N.E.2d 627 (1967).
105 Id. at 32, 227 N.E.2d at 635.
o01d. at 34, 227 N.E.2d at 636.
107 See, e.g., Ridenour v. State, 38 Ohio St. 272, 274 (1882).
[Vol. 33
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
rea and of the fair administration of criminal law. There are undoubtedly
times when a court may correctly presume from a person's acts that he had
an evil intent. For example, if X without provocation deliberately takes a
gun and fires six bullets into Y's head, it is reasonable to conclude that X
intended to cause Y's death, since most people are aware that such wounds
are practically certain to result in death. While a jury with these facts
could reasonably conclude that X intended to kill Y, all situations are
not so dear. It then becomes necessary to decide where the presumption
should justly be applied.
The presumption that a man intends the natural and probable results
of his acts arose in homicide cases involving the use of dangerous weap-
ons. 08 Due to the great likelihood of injury or death associated with such
devices, courts in such cases tended to require less evidence to show intent.
However, lack of judicial precision in application has extended it beyond
the narrow context in which it was developed and into areas in which its
bases do not apply. In Ridenour v. State,0 D for example, the presumption
was applied to a prosecution for shooting with intent to maim. The court
upheld the conviction because it felt that the paralysis of the victim's leg
was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's act. The court
reasoned that since the accused could have been convicted of actually
maiming the victim, he could not "be heard... to say that he did not in-
tend to do the very thing he did.""'' ° This is an overbroad use of the pre-
sumption; the court came very close to saying that intent could be inferred
from the proscribed result itself.
Later cases continued to widen the scope of the presumption, even
though courts refrained from inferring intent solely from the fact of a pro-
hibited act. In State v. Sappienza,"' which involved a charge of armed
robbery, the defendant had alleged that he had no guilty intent and was
only present at the robbery because his life had been threatened. Despite
corroboration by two co-defendants, the defendant was convicted. In up-
holding the conviction, the Supreme Court at Ohio stated that "It]he State
did not need to go into the question of intent on the part of the robbers
because of the universal rule, as a presumption of fact, that the natural and
probable consequences of every act deliberatedly done were intended by
the person who did them."" - The court did not discuss its rationale for
extending the presumption to a case of robbery but merely stated that it
was applying a "universal nile." The rule in Sappienza was further ex-
tended in In re Schrank13 to a case of unarmed robbery. The petitioner in
108 State v. Butler, 11 Ohio St. 2d 23, 34, 227 N.E.2d 627, 636 (1967).
109 38 Ohio St. 272 (1882).
':OId. at 274.
11184 Ohio St. 63, 95 N.E. 381 (1911).
112 Id. at 70, 95 N.E. at 382.
113 79 Ohio App. 286, 68 N.E.2d 808 (1946).
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Schrank had been convicted of "aiding and abetting" the robbery of a
ballot box and ballots from an election conducted by a union of which he
was a member. In refusing a writ of habeas corpus the court relied solely
(on a quotation from Sappienza with no further discussion.114
The scope of the presumption has been extended in other ways as well.
For example, in Roth v. State111 the defendant had been convicted on cir-
cumstantial evidence of aiding and abetting the burning of his own prop-
erty with the intent to defraud an insurance company. The court, follow-
ing a Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Asherowski,"10 held that since
only someone in privity with the defendant had the opportunity to set the
fire, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant not only aided and
abetted the crime, but also committed it with the intent of defrauding the in.
surer.117 Dicta in Roth suggested that it was valid to use the presumption
from circumstantial evidence even in capital cases.118 In State v. Schaf-
fer,119 the court extended the presumption beyond the use of deadly weap-
ons. In that case the defendant was convicted of first degree murder in
the strangulation death of an elderly woman. The defendant had gone
to see the victim for the purpose of borrowing money. When she refused,
an argument ensued in which the defendant struck and, after some strug-
gle, strangled her. Applying the presumption, the court found that "an
intent to kill with deliberation and premeditation may be found to exist
where a young man of strength and vigor uses his hands and muscles
to violently strangle an elderly, helpless woman."1 20  The court found also
that "[u]nder such circumstances, the hands may be found to be the
equivalent of a deadly weapon... ,"121
The problem is not so much that the courts in these cases found intent
under the particular circumstances. In most of the cases, it is at least argu-
able that the accused had the requisite intent. Rather, the problem is
that by extending the scope of the presumption to include conduct to which
the rationale for its creation does not apply, the original policy it was de,
signed to serve has been forgotten. There is a real risk that courts will
mechanically apply it without sufficient consideration for the standards
needed to assure just determinations of guilty intent. The decision of the
court of appeals in Butler'22 demonstrates that such a fear is justified.
However reprehensible one may find the appellont's conduct, it seems
114 Id. at 288, 68 N.E.2d at 809.
115 44 Ohio App. 420, 186 N.E. 7 (1933).
116 196 Mass. 342, 82 N.E. 13 (1907).
11744 Ohio App. at 425, 186 N.E. at 9.
IsId.
119 113 Ohio App. 125,177 NB.2d 534 (1960).
120ld. at 130-31, 177 NXE.2d at 538.
121 1d. at 131, 177 N.E.2d at 538.
1226 Ohio App. 2d 193, 217 N.E.2d 237 (1966). See discussion at note 98 supra,
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an undesirable policy to express that disapproval by twisting the standards
for second degree murder to such an extent that they become meaningless.
The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized this problem and restated the po-
sition that the presumption of intent should be applied only in cases where
there was a dangerous instrumentality involved.' The court specifically
declined to extend further the presumption by classifying a motor vehicle,
even when recklessly operated, as a deadly weapon. -4  The court also
analyzed the facts of the case to demonstrate its view of the nature of an
intent to kill. Starting with the premise that the defendants engaged in the
drag race to determine the relative merits of their cars, the court concluded
that
while violating the several traffic laws, a purpose or intent to become in-
volved in an accident cannot be inferred . . . , as an accident involving
either or both cars would result in the car involved in the accident losing
the race. An intent or purpose to maliciously kill by being involved in an
accident is contrary and inconsistent with the motive or purpose to win the
race. Regardless of how reprehensible or culpable was their conduct, the
reckless,... operation of their automobiles does not reach the high stan-
dard which the law prescribes for murder in the second degree .... 12
From this reasoning, it is apparent that the Butler court took a common
sense approach to the question of intent. Perhaps this opinion will help
to restore some basic logic to an area which has too often become caught
up in abstract judicial doctrines.
Beyond the over-extensive use of the presumption, Ohio courts have also
had some difficulty determining the factual question of the natural and
probable consequences of a man's acts. State v. Salter,'2 1 a prosecution for
first degree murder, illustrates the problems which Ohio courts have had
with this question. While not expressly based on the presumption, Salter
was decided by inferring the intent from the "surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances."'-12 The defendant was tried under the felony murder rule for
the death of an eleven year old girl to whom he had administered a com-
mon anaesthetic for the purpose of committing a rape. Due to a rare
glandular disorder, the victim was fatally allergic to the anaesthetic.12
Under the Ohio felony murder rule, the prosecution is required to prove
an intent and purpose to kill, just as it must for any prosecution of first
degree murder.2 9  The court, however, found the requisite intent from
the fact that the defendant had administered a known poison, even though
12 3 State v. Butler, 11 Ohio St. 2d 23, 34, 227 N.E.2d 627, 636 (1967).
124 Id. at 34, 227 N._.2d at 636.
125 Id. at 36, 227 NY..2d at 637.
126 149 Ohio S. 264, 78 N.E.2d 575 (1948).
127Id. at 268, 78 N.E.2d at 577.
128 Id. at 274, 78 N.X.2d at 580 (Hart, J., dissenting).
129 State v. Farmer, 156 Ohio St. 214, 102 N.E.2d 11 (1951); Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St.
131 (1857).
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there was no evidence that he desired her death. The court ignored the
fact that the victim was unusually susceptible to chloroform' 10 and an-
nounced a rule that "where proof establishes beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused, in the perpetration of rape, intentionally administered poison
knowing it to be such and death resulted therefrom, such accused may be
found guilty of murder in the first degree."'131 Although the defendant's
act was undoubtedly culpable, there are ways to impose sanctions without
so violently twisting the meaning of the murder statute. It certainly goes
contrary to the common meaning of the words to say that a death resulting
from a rare physical defect was a natural and probable consequence of the
defendant's act.
Perhaps Salter, although it has never been overruled, is an aberration.
Four years later, the same court decided State v. Farmer32 which also was
a prosecution under the felony murder rule. In Farmer, the defendant
struck the victim on the head with a stick during an argument over the
purchases of two tires. The court found that since the defendant had at-
tempted to remove the tires without paying for them, the felony murder
rule was applicable.3 3 However, the court reaffirmed the rule first an-
nounced in Robbins v. StateM that even in the case of a felony murder,
there must be a true purpose or intent to kill. 3 ' To determine if the de-
fendant had had an intent to kill, the court applied the presumption but
held that the facts did not show that death was a natural and probable
consequence of the defendant's act. It is not dear whether this decision
affects the validity of Salter, since the facts in the two cases were different.
The only mention of Salter by the Farmer court was that the former case
had questioned the validity of Robbins.13 6 However, by reaffirming the
Robbins requirement of a purposeful killing in felony murder cases, Farmer
necessarily invalidates the rationale of Salter. At any rate, since the stan-
dards for determining what is a natural and probable consequence remain
undefined, the possibility of erroneous decisions still exists.
State v. Swiger'37 reveals a general problem which has arisen in apply-
ing the presumption of intent. The difficulty arises from circumstances
showing that, while the result can be said to be a natural and probable
one, it is questionable that it was intended by the defendant. In Swiger,
a prosecution for first degree murder, the defendant severely beat an el-
derly woman to compel her to disclose the location of her safe. Two weeks
130 This fact is not even mentioned in the opinion of the court. Rather, it is mentioned
only in the dissenting opinion. See note 128 supra.
' ' 149 Ohio St. at 269, 78 N.E.2d at 578.
132 156 Ohio St. 214, 102 N.E.2d 11 (1952).
133Id. at 216-17, 102 N.E.2d at 13.
134 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857).
153 156 Ohio St at 221, 102 N.E.2d at 16.
136 Id. at 222, 102 N.E.2d at 16.
37 5 Ohio St. 2d 151, 214 N.E.2d 417 (1966).
[Vol, 3
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
after the incident, the nearly recovered victim suddenly died of a pulmon-
ary embolism. The court held that since such blood dots frequently oc-
cur in people confined to beds, the jury could reasonably find that the de-
fendant's act was the proximate cause of the embolism.'3 The court, by
applying the presumption, found that death was a natural and probable
consequence of the defendant's act and that the defendant, therefore, pos-
sessed the requisite intent to kill.-9 While the result in this case is
not dearly erroneous, there is a strong question whether the facts estab-
lish any more than a reckless unintentional homicide. Because the de-
fendant wished to discover the location of the victim's safe, her death served
no useful purpose to him. To say that this defendant had a purpose to kill
is to ignore the logic of the situation. The presumption of intent was not
created as a device to allow a court to impose liability whenever it was
outraged by a defendant's conduct. Rather, the presumption was devel-
oped to aid the court in determining the true intent of the actor. Any
other use of it is questionable both as a matter of logic and as a matter
of substantial justice.
Proof of purpose under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code will pose
problems nearly identical to those which currently exist. The drafters of
the Proposed Code have not spoken to these difficulties. Since it was
their stated goal to rid Ohio mens rea law of its present confusion, such
silence is surprising. It is of little ultimate value to replace the current
chaos with a tight system that cannot be rationally administered. Neither
the proposed definitions nor the committee comments provide any alter-
native to the current devices of presumptions or inferences from the sur-
rounding circumstances. Furthermore, nothing elsewhere in the Proposed
Code provides any significant guidance. Section 2901.04 provides that
code sections shall be strictly construed against the state and in favor of
the accused.140 In addition, § 2901.05 states that the accused must be
acquitted unless all elements of the crime charged, including the requisite
culpability, have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 ' \While these
two rules may be of some help in resolving close cases, they are merely
statutory codifications of existing judicial doctrines. Therefore, it is doubt-
ful that they will be of any more than minimal benefit. Since there is
nothing in the Proposed Code to the contrary, it must be assumed that cur-
rent judicial interpretations of "intent" will remain in effect and will be ap-
plicable to "purpose" under the new code. If this is so, the Proposed
Criminal Code will make no improvement upon existing confusion in this
area.
1 38 Id. at 155, 214 N.E.2d at 422.
139 Id. at 157, 214 NE.2d at 423.
34o PROP. OHIo CnML. CODE § 2901.04.
141 Id. § 2901.05.
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It is possible, however, that some of the confusion may be avoided
by framing appropriate new jury instructions on the meaning of purpose
and the proof of its existence. On this point, it is interesting to note that
one of the most serious objections to the Model Penal Code's definition of
culpability is that the development of a new terminology will only confuse
juries.1"2 The chief draftsman of the Model Penal Code, Herbert
Wechsler, addressed himself to this criticism and indicated that the Insti-
tute recommended that new instructions be framed which embody the con-
cepts contained in the definitions. 143  As the situation presently exists in
Ohio, even if new instructions are formulated, it is difficult to see how they
would result in improvement. Jury instructions are grounded on judicial
doctrines and definitions. Since Proposed Criminal Code "purpose" is de-
fined in terms of "intent," and the current judicial position is that the two
are synonymous, unless there is some unforeseen change in the underlying
precedents, there seems to be no way to significantly improve current in.
structions.
An example of the type of instruction presently given to Ohio juries
is the Ohio Pattern Jury Instruction-Criminal. 14 4  "Intent" is defined in
these instructions as "a decision of the mind to knowingly do an act with
a conscious objective of accomplishing a specific result. Intent and pur-
pose mean the same thing.'-14r The instructions further state that the jury
should not be told to presume that an accused intended the natural and
probable consequences of his acts.1 0 Rather, the jury is to be instructed
to determine the actor's intent from "the manner in which [the action]
is done, the [means] ...used and all the other facts and circumstances
in evidence.' 147 This instruction is relatively unobjectionable and, in fact,
contains two strong features. First, the fact that "intent" is defined in
terms of "conscious objective" emphasizes that intent is a subjective ele.
ment. Second, it is a major improvement that the instructions specifically
discourage the use of presumptions of intent. Presumptions are, at best,
of dubious validity.148 This is especially true in an area so subjective as
culpability. Since a number of judges were involved in the formulating
of these instructions, perhaps the decision against using the presumption
reflects a change in judicial thinking. If this is correct, then the future of
142 Kuh, A Prosecutor Coosders the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L REv. 608, 622
(1963).
,'
43 Wechsler, Forward, Symposium on the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 589,
590 (1963). See also Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L REV. 594-96
(1963).




148 See, e.g., Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law on the Burdcn of
Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1920).
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Ohio mens rea law may be more promising. However, since these instruc-
tions do not have the force of law, there is nothing to guarantee that they
will be employed universally.
There is a second set of pattern jury instructions which are also pres-
ently used in Ohio courts-Ohio Instructions to Juries. 9  In addition to
instructing the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding the act to
determine the actor's intent, these instructions also state that the jury
should "bear in mind" that there is a "legal presumption" that a man in-
tends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.'* The danger
of such an instruction is that the standards are vague and give little
guidance to the jury. It should be noted that such an instruction was given
to the jury in State v. Salter.151 Since the jurors had so little to aid them,
it becomes less surprising that they found the defendant to have purpose-
fully killed. Even if future instructions omit the presumption regard-
ing intent, juries will still be forced to make intuitive judgments with no
more to guide them than vague factors such as the "facts and circumstances
surrounding the act." Thus, even under the Proposed Code, juries will un-
doubtedly still base their judgment upon how reprehensible the defendanes
conduct appears to be.
Despite its shortcomings, the "purpose" definition of the Proposed
Criminal Code may prove to be an improvement over current law. Al-
though the concept may prove awkward in practice, the fact that the sub-
section exists may itself serve a useful function. By creating four discrete
levels of culpability and by specifying the crimes to which they shall apply,
the proposal will alert courts to the legislature's intention to create a dif-
ference between the culpability necessary to establish, for example, capital
murder (purpose)1 2 from murder (knowledge).'113 For those few crimes
requiring proof of purpose, this factor alone could lead to tighter stan-
dards for the quantum of evidence needed. Since "purpose," "knowl-
edge," and perhaps "recklessness" as well are all presently subsumed under
the general label of "intent," it is possible that once these concepts are
separated the strange interpretations which have arisen under present law
will disappear.
Insight into the course of future developments in the Ohio law of
mens rea may be gained by looking at the experience of jurisdictions which
have already enacted codes based on the Model Penal Code. In 1961, the
state of Illinois adopted such a criminal code.'" Since the law of culpa-
bility in effect in Illinois prior to the adoption of the new code was
149 3 L. FEss, Omo INSTRucrioNs To JURIES § 86.19 (1953).
150 Id.
151 149 Ohio St. 264,78 N.E.2d 575 (1948).
152 PROp. OrnO CIM. CODE § 2903.01.
153 Id. § 2903.02.
'4 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 (1961).
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similar in many respects to current Ohio law, the Illinois experience with
a codified mens rea may give some indication of future Ohio culpability
law. Illinois adopted the Model Penal Code format for "purpose." How-
ever, the Illinois legislature apparently decided that since "intent" was
the most common culpability concept in Illinois statutes, it should be used
in place of "purpose." 1  The Illinois code provides that "[a) person ...
acts intentionally ... to accomplish a result.., when his conscious objec-
tive . . . is to accomplish that result. .. ."16 From this wording, it is clear
that the Illinois legislature also focused on the subjective nature of inten-
tion. In the comments to this code, the drafters state:
The use of the word "intent" in the 1961 code is limited to conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a desired result, as distinguished from
"general intent" which often has been used to describe also a presumption
of culpability which follows from injury or awareness that certain volun-
tary acts will, or probably will, have wrongful or unlawful results.1 7
Two points about this comment should be noted: (.) the requirement of
a "conscious objective" to establish intent, and (2) the careful distinction
of "intent" from "general intent" as that phrase was used in precode Illi-
nois law. Furthermore, the comments indicate a legislative intent to rigidly
exclude any concept of "general intent" (the predisposition to commit a
crime as opposed to the desire to bring about a specific prohibited result)
from the law of intentional crimes.
Although there is not a large body of case law interpreting the new
Illinois code, the cases that do exist reveal a judiciary that is troubled by
mens rea despite a clear expression of legislative intent. Some Illinois
courts have apparently noted the change in the mens rea law. For ex-
ample, in People v. Ford," s a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, an
intermediate appellate court stated that under the new code the mental
state of a reckless man fell short of the culpability envisioned by "intent."
But, since involuntary manslaughter did not require proof of intent, proof
of the defendant's recklessness was sufficient to justify the conviction. In
People v. Wooff,150 the court stated that "intent to commit theft" was
limited to a conscious objective to commit that result, but since the defen.
dant had failed to object to an instruction relating to his intent, any pos-
sible error had been waived. In People v. Higgins,1°0 the court stated that
to obtain a conviction for an intentional "aggravated battery" the prosecu-
tion was required to prove more than just recklessness as that level of cul-
pability falls short of intent. These cases, while recognizing that the stan-
'15Id. § 4-3 (1961), Committee Comments at 166.
150 Id. § 4-4 (1961). (emphasis supplied).
'57ld. § 4-3 (1961), Committee Comments at 167. (emphasis supplied).
158 56 111. App. 2d 153,206 N.E.2d 105 (1965).
159 120 I1. App. 2d 225, 256 N.E.2d 881 (1970).
160 86 Il1. App. 2d 202, 229 N.E.2d 161 (1967).
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dards for intent had been changed, do not deal at any length with those
standards. Furthermore, most of the statements in the cases about mens Tea
are dicta at best. On the other hand, there is another line of cases in which
the Illinois courts have reached disturbing results. In People v. Powell,1 61
despite the code comment discouraging presumptions, the court reaffirmed
the familiar rule that one is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his voluntary acts. In People v. Ray,1a02 the defendant had
forced entry into a stranger's apartment where he was seen and frightened
away. He was charged and convicted of "burglary with intent to commit
theft." The court of appeals held that a jury was justified in finding intent
to commit theft on these facts and stated that the fortuitous interruption
of a criminal act, thwarting the completion thereof, did not vitiate the in-
tent to commit the act."" The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is
that Illinois courts are content to continue applying old interpretations re-
gardless of the fact that the legislature has created new standards which
should require different treatment.
The experience in New York follows the same general pattern as that
of Illinois. While any conclusions which could be drawn on the New
York experience would be somewhat speculative since the New York code
was not enacted until 1967,164 certain features of New York mens tea law
seem to be emerging. For example, in People v. Colozzo,' the court
stated that knowledge of the underlying fact which made a defendant's
conduct unlawful is usually necessary for conviction. In People v. Shaugh-
nessy,'66 the court stated that while the New York legislature could have,
under the new code, made an act criminal without regard to mens tea, it
was still necessary to prove that a defendant's act was voluntary, unless the
act was voluntary intoxication. The New York decisions also indicate that
the historical presumption of intent is still being applied. In In re Tay-
lor,' 67 the court adjudged the defendant a juvenile delinquent for striking
another child with a stone and causing a head wound. The court deter-
mined that the injury was a natural and probable consequence of throwing
the stone and presumed that she intended to cause the injury. Since the bat-
tery in this case occurred as a result of an argument, it is likely that the
defendant was upset and not in complete control of her actions. There-
fore, there is some question that her act was truly "voluntary" or that the
injury was "purposeful" as that word is commonly understood. As the
16161 IM. App. 2d 238, 209 N-E.2d 345 (1965).
162 252 N.E2d 772 (1. Ct. App. 1969).
163 Id. at 773 (headnote 2).
164 N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1967).
16; 54 Misc. 2d 687, 283 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. C. 1967).
166 66 Misc. 2d 19; 319 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Dist. Cr. 1971).
tO7 62 Misc. 2d 529,309 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Farn. Ct. 1970).
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act was more reckless than purposeful, it illustrates the effects of rigidly
applying legal rules without adequately considering all the facts in a case.
From these few examples, it is possible to conclude that even under a
new mens rea standard, Ohio courts will probably continue to apply the
presumption of intent to find "purpose." This in itself does not represent
a great problem, because the standard is valid in most cases. However,
the course of Ohio culpability law illustrates that the courts have mis-,
applied the rule in several cases. If the Ohio courts continue to apply the
presumption that a man intends the natural and probable consequences of
his acts, it will be necessary for courts to become more discriminating in
the way that it is applied. Otherwise, the legislative attempt to clear up
Ohio mens tea law will be frustrated. The policies which led to the de-
velopment of the "purpose" standard, that criminal sanctions should be
applied only when the accused merits them, are vital and should not be
undermined in practice by inexact applications of the presumption of in-
tent.
B. Knowledge
Under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code, the required mental state for
most crimes will be "knowledge."'" 8 As in the case of "purpose," "knowl-
edge" is defined in terms of a subjective standard. Under current Ohio
law, "knowledge" is generally used interchangeably with "intent" and "pur-
pose."'169 However, its use in statutes has been somewhat narrower in scope;
"knowledge" is used primarily to define crimes of fraud or actual malice.
For example, the Ohio Revised Code makes it a crime to "knowingly send
a writing .. .containing willful and malicious threats of injury
.... -170 Under the Proposed Criminal Code, however, "knowledge" is
used to establish liability for a wide range of prohibited conduct and to
perform the function currently served by "intent" in defining many crimes.
Since the term is to be used so widely, it is especially important that this
term be adequately defined. In fact, however, the proposed definition of
"knowledge" is one of the weak points in the Proposed Criminal Code mens
rea provisions.
Under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code, a person acts knowingly,
"when he is consciously aware that his conduct is likely to cause a certain
result or is likely to be of a certain nature.. . ,,7 The essential element
is a subjective personal awareness on the part of the actor that he is en-
168 PRop. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.22(B):
A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is consciously aware
that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain na-
ture. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is consciously aware that
such circumstances are likely to exist.
169 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 7 Ohio 539 (1836).
'70 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.39 (Page 1954).
171 PRop. OIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.22(B).
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gaging in prohibited conduct or that his conduct will lead to prohibited
'results. While the drafters of the Proposed Criminal Code have focused
on the subjective element, they have mishandled that subjectivity. The
Model Penal Code, which is followed by the drafters of the Proposed Ohio
Code, includes in its types of culpability three levels which are subjective
in nature--purpose, knowledge, and recklessness. Thus, it is important
that each level be distinguished from the others. The Model Penal Code
carefully provides such distinctions, but the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code
does not.
For most of the common crimes, the Proposed Criminal Code creates a
level of criminality for each of the four levels of defined culpability.
This may be illustrated by looking at the homicide crimes. Among the
homicide crimes are (1) "capital murder" which requires proof of pur-
pose;"7 2 (2) "murder"' 7 and "voluntary manslaughter"'174 which require
proof of knowledge; (3) "involuntary manslaughter"'17  which is estab-
lished by recklessness; and (4) "negligent homicide" which requires only
negligenceY.7  Although in all cases the result is the death of another
person, there are two major differences between each level of offense.
First, the penalties differ widely, ranging from a misdemeanor in the first
degree in the case of negligent homicide (maximum imprisonment six
months) to the death penalty in the case of capital murder. Which of
these penalties will be imposed in a given case is determined largely by
the other major difference between the crimes-the degree of culpability.
The Proposed Criminal Code provides that any degree of culpability in-
dudes all lesser degrees of culpability. 7 7 Thus, proof of purpose suffices
also to establish knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. On the other
hand, proof of recklessness is not sufficient to establish knowledge or pur-
pose. If there is no dear method by which a jury can distinguish between
these levels, substantial injustice could result. If, for example, the def-
initions do not adequately distinguish knowing conduct on the one hand from
reckless conduct on the other, then an actor whose reckless conduct results in
the death of some person could be convicted of a knowing murder, a crime
more severe than his culpability would justify. As the proposed definition
of knowledge currently stands, such a result could occur. This possibility
arises from the fact that Proposed Ohio Criminal Code "knowledge" de-
lineates no more than Model Penal Code recklessness. Under the Model
Penal Code, both knowledge and recklessness require proof of the actor's
subjective awareness of the nature of his conduct. In the case of knowl-
172 Id. § 2903.01.
173 Id. § 2903.02.
174 PROP. OHIO CEmL CODE § 2903.03 (as amended in SUB. I-LB. 511).
175 Id. § 2903.04.
176 Id. § 2903.05 (dangerous weapon).
177 PRop. Omo C, i. CODE § 2901.22(E).
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edge, the actor must be aware that the prohibited result was "practically
certain" to occur,78 while, in the case of recklessness, the actor need be
aware only that there is a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" that the re-
sult would occur.179  Basically, this is the difference between certainty and
probability. Under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code, however, to prove
the actor had knowledge, it is only necessary to prove that the actor was
aware that the result was "likely" to occur.18 0 As the word "likely" is
commonly understood, it denotes, at most, that something is probable
and cannot be said to rise to the level of "practical certainty." Thus,
the terminology of the statute describes something like "substantial risk."
There is another reason why the use of "likely" as the standard for
knowing conduct may present difficulties. Under the civil law of torts,
"likelihood" is a familiar concept. It is not an unrealistic fear that some
courts and juries may confuse the new criminal likelihood with civil likeli-
hood. This would represent a serious problem because a different degree
of proof is required for criminal than for tort liability. Under tort law,
the plaintiff need prove only that it was more likely than not that the de-
fendant caused the injury. In criminal prosecutions, on the other hand,
there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the prohibited con-
duct occurred, that it was the defendant who did the act, and that he had
the requisite degree of culpability. 81  In a criminal case under the Pro-
posed Ohio Criminal Code, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused was aware that his conduct was more likely than not to
result in the prohibited harm. The practical effect of this standard could
well be that a jury would find instead that it was more likely than not that
the accused knew his conduct would cause the prohibited result. Such a
knowledge standard would represent a significant dilution of the criminal
law proof standard.
When the knowledge definitions of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code
are compared with parallel provisions in three other recent codes, it be-
comes evident that the Ohio version differs sharply from the thrust of
those codes. Echoing the Model Penal Code emphasis on "practical cer-
tainty," these other codes also insist on proof that the actor was certain of
the nature of his conduct. For example, the Proposed Federal Criminal
178 M.P.C. § 2.02(2) (b) (P.O.D.):
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element c'f an offense when:
(ii) . . he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result.
(emphasis supplied)
179 MP.C. § 2.02(2)(c) (P.O.D.):
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material cle.
ment exists or will result from his conduct....




Code speaks of actual knowledge or a "firm belief, unaccompanied by
substantial doubt" that the prohibited result will occur.lC2  The absence
of a substantial doubt seems to be a much stronger standard than mere
likelihood. Furthermore, the use of "substantial doubt" in formulating
the standard fits better with the "reasonable doubt" requirement of the
criminal law burden of proof than does the "likelihood" test of the Proposed
Ohio Criminal Code. The definition of knowledge in the Illinois Criminal
Code of 1961 is even more closely patterned after the Model Penal Code.
Under the Illinois code, a person acts knowingly when "he is consciously
aware that [a prohibited] result is practically certain to be caused by his
conduct."'' 8 The comments to the Illinois code, by providing that "the
awareness involved in knowledge must be carefully distinguished from
'substantial and unjustifiable risk' involved in recldessness," 11 further
emphasize the intent of the legislature as to the degree of certainty in-
volved in knowledge. However, it must be noted that the comments quite
reasonably point out that this does not mean that absolute certainty is re-
quired but only practical certainty.185 A more restrictive standard would
render knowledge, like purpose, impossible to prove directly and would
introduce into the proof of knowledge the absurdities which have de-
veloped in the proof of purpose. The solution to this problem adopted
by Illinois seems preferable to reducing knowledge to the level of reck-
lessness as the drafters of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code have done.
The definition of knowledge in the New York Penal Law provides
that "[al person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circum-
stance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his
conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists."186 It is not
dear from the language of the statute what degree of certainty must be
proved to establish knowledge. However, from the phrase "conduct is
of that nature... ," it is dear that New York has not reduced knowledge
to recklessness. While there may be problems interpreting the exact
meaning of this provision, they will certainly be less than those which could
arise under the Ohio version which equates knowledge with recklessness.
C. Recklessness
The problems which may arise under the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code
definitions of purpose and knowledge could be minor compared to those
which may arise under the "recklessness" provisions. In addition to the
182 The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, STUD, DR-T OF A
NEW FEDERAL CRMUNAL CODE § 302(l)(b) (1970) [hereinafter dted as PROP. FED. CRI .
CODE].
18 3 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-5(b) (1961).
14ILL REv. STAT. cL. 38, § 4-3 (1961), Committee Comments at 169.
185 Id.
186 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2) (McKinney 1967).
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considerable problems of proof inherent in a subjective concept, there is
also a more basic question of what the legislators intended to convey by
their definition. As the definition emerged from tha Technical Committee,
it provided that "[a) person acts recklessly when he consciously and un-
justifiably disregards a substantial risk that his conduct may . . . be of a
certain nature."187  This provision is substantially identical to the Model
Penal Code definition of recklessness. 188 The only major difference lies
in that the Model Penal Code includes the statement that the risk must
be of such a nature that to disregard it "involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor's situation."' 89 This language in the Model Penal Code would alert
a court to a definite subjective element and to an objective element as well.
The fact that the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code lacks similar language is
not of itself a serious deficiency since it is arguable that an objective ele-
ment may be inherent in the concept of a "substantial risk" and the "un-
justifiable" disregard of such a risk. However, if this was the intent
of the drafters, they could have removed doubt by including language
similar to that in the Model Penal Code.
What the drafters did intend becomes less clear on examination of their
comments instead of the definition itself. The Technical Committee states
that it views recklessness in the sense of "rashness," or "heedless indiffer-
ence to the consequences."'190 Furthermore, they state that the Committee
does not envision a requirement of "wantonness or malice" before reckless-
ness may be found."9 It is not dear whether the Committee uses the
terms "wantonness" or "malice" in their common or their legal senses.
However, the tone of the whole comment seems to negate a requirement
of subjective awareness of the risk. By stating that "wantonness" is not
required for liability, the Committee may be adopting a wholly objective
standard. If this view becomes the settled definition, then it seems to be
187 PROP. OHIo CRIM. CODE § 2901.22(C):
A person acts recklessly when he consciously and unjustifiably disregards a sub-
stantial risk that his conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain
nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when he consciously
and unjustifiably disregards a substantial risk that such circumstances may exist.
18 8 M.P.C. § 2.02(2) (c) (P.O.D.). See note 179 .rsupra.
189 M.P.C. § 2.02(2)(c) (P.O.D.):
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, the actor's failure to perceive It,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to
him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor's situation.
190 PROP. OiMo CRM. CODE § 2901.22(D), Committee Comments at 41:
Division (C) is intended to describe recklessness in the sense of rashness, or heed-
less indifference to the consequences. It is not the Technical Committee's object
to require that recklessness must have an element of wanionness or malice, al-






another major departure from the Model Penal Code view that a reckless
actor, just as the purposeful or knowing actor, has a "guilty mind."
When the recklessness definition passed the House of Representatives,
there were some significant amendments to its wording. In place of the
Technical Committee's suggestion of "conscious disregard," the House
substituted "with heedless indifference to the consequences."10 12  On one
level this represents nothing more than incorporating the comments into
the substance of the statute. On another level, however, this substitution
may represent a definite change in the standard. To say that a person is
reckless when he "disregards" a risk rather than when he "consciously dis-
regards" a risk is not itself a major change since a person logically must
be conscious of a risk before he can "disregard" it. However, the language
in the original version is not wholly redundant since it serves the purpose
of emphasizing the subjective element of recklessness. The use of the
phrase "heedless indifference to the consequences," however, does represent
difficulties. Since this phrase is not defined in the Proposed Criminal Code,
it will be necessary for the courts to construe it, if they are to give effect
to legislative intent. In large part, the fact that courts have had to con-
strue undefined terms of legal art has led to the confusion which currently
characterizes Ohio mens rea law. If an actor is to be held responsible for
disregarding a substantial "risk," it must be the risk that his conduct will
lead to a result prohibited by the law. "Result" is fairly to be considered
as a synonym for "consequence." Thus, an actor would be held liable if
he consciously disregards a risk that his conduct will lead to a certain con-
sequence. Since "heedless" implies a lack of awareness, it is anomalous
to say that by disregarding a known risk he has been heedlessly indifferent
to the consequences. A phrase like "consciously and unjustifiably" disre-
garding an unreasonable risk seems to import something approaching pre-
meditation or, in other words, assessing of a risk before acting.
There is another and more substantial objection to the proposed defini-
tion for recklessness. According to the version passed by the House of
Representatives, recklessness liability would be imposed whenever a person
disregards a substantial risk that his conduct "may" cause a prohibited re-
sult or be of a prohibited nature. 93  Imposing liability whenever conduct
"may" cause a result rather than when the conduct "will" cause the result
as the Model Penal Code requires, is a significant reduction of the stan-
dard. In a jurisdiction applying the Model Penal Code standard, a jury
102 PROP. OHIO CRD. CODE § 2901.22(C) (as amended in SuB. H.B. 511):
A person acts recklessly when with heedless indiffercenco to the consequences he
disregards a substantial risk that his conduct may cause a certain result or may be
of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when with
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would have to be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt both (1) that an
actor actually knew of a substantial risk but acted despite his awareness,
and (2) that the risk was of such a nature that the result would be prac-
tically certain to follow. "May," on the other hand, is not a synonym for
"certain." Furthermore, "may" does not even rise to the level of "prob-
able." Rather, the most it describes is "possible." Thus, all the definition
provides is that liability may be imposed in any case where it was not abso-
lutely impossible for the result to occur. There are two major implica-
tions of such a broad standard: (1) the universe of culpably reckless acts
has been enormously enlarged, which could result in greatly increasing the
chances that a law-abiding citizen will be drawn into the criminal process;
and (2) the value of the standard as notice to potential actors of what con-
duct they must avoid has been reduced since too much behavior falls with-
in the prohibition.
The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code defines "substantial risk" as a "ser-
'ious chance ... that a certain result may occur ... ."I This definition
also provides little guidance in interpreting the legislative intent concerning
reckless mens rea. Here again, the meaning has been clouded by the use
of the indefinite and broadly inclusive term "may." The phrase "serious
chance" seems to connote some concept analogous to probability or, per-
-baps, "high" probability. If the definition for "substantial risk" is substi-
tuted in place of the "recklessness" provision, liability could be imposed
whenever there is a serious chance that the result would follow. It should
be noted that the provision does not prohibit conduct when there is a
serious chance that the result will follow, but only when there is a serious
chance that the occurrence would not be impossible. This suggested form.
ulation is not intended to be an exercise in abstract semantics, or in the
ambiguities of the English language, but is intended to point out that there
is a vast difference between what is conveyed by the proposition that an
event will occur and what is conveyed by the proposition that it may oc-
cur. Since a jury will be forced without special training to deal with this
standard, any unnecessary source of confusion should be avoided.
The net result of the recklessness definition is to eliminate the require-
ment that an actor have actual knowledge that a risk exists. It still remains
to consider what is left after the elimination of the subjective element.
There are several ways in which the statutory language may be interpreted.
Whatever else the standard may be, it does not include purpose or knowl-
edge. On the other hand, the standard does not seem to be aimed at creat-
ing absolute or strict liability. Rather, the standard probably creates a
negligence standard in one of the several ways that term is used in the law.
194 PROP. OHIO CRDL CODE § 2901.01 (H) :
"Substantial risk" means a serious chance, as contrasted with a slight or significant




It is possible that the drafters intended to apply a civil tort standard of
negligence. Such a standard would impose liability for a failure to meet
the duty of "ordinary care." Under tort law, this duty is measured in
terms of the hypothetical "reasonable man"-the level of care which
would be observed by a reasonable person in the same situation as the
actor.'9 5 The use of "heedless indifference to the consequences" suggests
that the Proposed Criminal Code "recklessness" involves more culpable
conduct than mere tort negligence. Furthermore, the comments to the
Proposed Criminal Code definition of "negligence" indicate that the Tech-
nical Committee intended tort negligence to be the standard for criminal
negligence. 98 Therefore, Ohio Code reddessness must lie somewhere be-
tween Model Penal Code recklessness and Ohio tort negligence.
There are several other interpretive possibilities which involve familiar
concepts. One of these is "gross negligence." This concept is sometimes
defined as the failure to meet the level of care that even an inattentive
person would exercise, or the lack of even slight diligence in determining
the existence and severity of a risk of injury.97 At other times, it has
been defined as conduct which evidences an almost complete indifference to
the value of human life.98 It is possible that the Proposed Criminal Code
recklessness is aimed at one of these concepts. The Technical Committee
illustrates its view of criminal recklessness by the following example:
[D]oing in excess of 100 mph on a freeway would be reckless, even in
dry, dear weather, since at such a high rate of speed there is a substantial
risk that the driver, no matter how skilled, can lose and not be able to re-
cover control, or will have insufficient time to react to even the usual emer-
gencies of freeway driving. 99
This language strongly suggests that the standard to be used is that of the
reasonable man. "Heedless indifference to the consequences" may, then,
be analogous to tort recklessness, "indifference to human life" or a gross
deviation from the care of a reasonable person.
Despite the implication of the example, the most likely interpretation
of Proposed Ohio Criminal Code recklessness is that it creates a form of
"subjective negligence." This interpretation is suggested by the fact that
the definition still talks about "disregarding" a risk. In tort law there
has been a continuing debate over the standard which should be used to
195 Cleveland, CoL & Cim R.R. v. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570 (1858); Brewing Co. v. Bauer, 50
Ohio St. 560, 35 N.E. 55 (1893); Mason v. Moore, 73 Ohio St 275, 76 N.E 932 (1906); De
Groodt v. Skrbina, 111 Ohio St 108, 144 N.E 601 (1924); Denison Coal & Supply Co. T.
Barrelheim, 122 Ohio St. 374, 171 N.E 835 (1930); Pickens v. Diecker, 21 Ohio St. 212
(1871).
198PROP. Omo CnmrL CoDE § 2901.22(D), Committee Comments at 42.
197 Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio Sr. 59, 133 N.E. 85 (1921); Gerthung v. Stambaugh-Thomp-
son Co., 1 Ohio App. 176 (1913).
19 8 jLP.C. § 210.2 (P.O.D.)
1 9 9 PROP. OHIO CRE& CODE § 2901.22, Committee Comments at 41.
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measure negligent conduct.2 0  Although an objective standard is the one
usually applied,' 01 there is an alternative which has been frequently urged, '2'
Under this standard, negligence derives from a state of mind of indiffer-
ence or inadvertence which has been called "a form of mens rea, standing
side by side with wrongful intention as a formal ground of responsibil-
ity."203 A negligent person is one who does not know of a risk and who
does not care to learn of it before he engages in conduct. If, on the other
hand, he gives "anxious consideration to the conscquences, ' 2'1 then he is
not negligent. Such a standard would turn Proposed Ohio Criminal Code
recklessness into an assessment of the actor's character. The rationale of a
subjective standard is that criminal liability even for inadvertent harms
should correspond as closely as possible with moral culpability. It is un-
desirable, however, to require actors with personal deficiencies to meet a
rigid standard of conduct which is beyond their capabilities. The use of
"heedless indifference to the consequences" to define recklessness seems to
aim at such a subjective standard. The difference between a subjective
negligence standard and the Model Penal Code subjective criminal reck-
lessness standard is that the focus of the subjective negligence standard is
on the external conduct of the actor, while the Model Penal Code focuses
on the subjective internal mental state of the actor before he acts. Another
major difference is that although the subjective tort standard looks to the
mind of the actor, his conduct is negligent when he fails to exercise due
care. This is a lower standard than for Model Penal Code recklessness,
which requires a gross deviation from law-abiding behavior.
Objections to a standard which looks at the mental state of the actor
have caused most jurisdictions, even in tort law, to reject the subjective
standard. Traditionally, it has been felt that it is impossible accurately to
weigh the differences between people and the implications of those differ-
ences as they relate to conduct. However, this is essentially the same as
the problem of proving subjective intent, so it is more accurate to say that
it is inconvenient rather than impossible. Another objection to a subjec.
tive standard is that all men should have the law applied to them equally.201
In light of this view, it is appropriate to note that, theoretically, there
could be a different result in a case if a subjective standard is applied rather
200 2 F. HARPER & F. JA.Es, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
HARPERt & JAMES).
2 0 l Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference, Tha Relation of Mental Statti
to Negligence, 39 HARv. L REV. 849 (1926).
202See, e.g., SALMOND, supra note 8, at 535; F. WHARTON, NEGLIGENcX § 3 (2d ed.
1878); P. WINFIELD, LAW OF TORT 436 (2d ed. 1943).
203 SALMOND, supra note 8, at 538.
204 Edgerton, supra note 201, at 853, quoting from J. SALMOND, TORTS 493 (11th ed.
1953).
205W. PROSSER, TORTS 150 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]: "[The stan-
dard) must be, so far as possible, the same for all persons, since tho law can have no favorites."
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than an objective standard. If there were such a difference, it would be
likely to arise in cases involving ignorance, physical defects and poor judg-
ment. Psychological studies have shown that personal factors such as poor
eyesight account for more accidental injuries than is usually supposed2 0
In such situations, evidence of the actor's personal characteristics would be
admissible on the question of his mental state under a subjective test but
inadmissible under an objective test. Before a jury could find liability, it
must have been persuaded that the defendant was heedlessly indifferent to
the dangers. Thus, if the jury concluded that the actor's characteristics
caused the result, there would be no liability. The major weakness of a
subjective standard for criminal law is that despite its focus on the condi-
tion of the actor, it is still a civil tort standard of negligence. Since re&-
lessness will establish liability for some serious crimes 7 and will be used
as the residuary level of culpability whenever a statute fails to mention a
mens tea requirement,"" the definition of this standard is very important.
When there is such serious potential liability as here, sound public policy
demands that a more traditional, criminal recklessness standard be ap-
plied. Subjective negligence as a criminal standard does not offer ade-
quate protection to the public. Too many actors whose conduct is only
negligent, and who should only be liable civilly, will now be subject to crim-
inal sanctions. For example, if X walks through a door rapidly without
considering that someone might be on the other side, and as he pushes the
door open it strikes Y knocking Y to the ground where he hits his head
and is killed, X is technically guilty of involuntary manslaughter (reck-
lessly causing Y's death).209 There is no question that X should be liable
to his victim civilly, but the penalty for manslaughter under the new code
is a term of imprisonment of two to ten years. -' It is highly questionable
that X, although subjectively negligent, would be a "criminal" as that word
is commonly understood. Yet that would be the result under the Proposed
Ohio Criminal Code definition of recklessness.
D. Negligence
The fourth and least culpable level of mens rea under the Proposed
Criminal Code is "negligence." 21' Criminalization of negligence is es-
206See authorities collected in HARPER & JAMiEs, supra note 200, § 11.4.
207 E.g., PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2902.04 (as amended in SUB. H.B. 511) (involuntary
manslaughter). Id. § 2907.04 (corruption of a minor).
208 PROP. OHo CRM. CODE § 2901.21(B).
209 PROP. OMO CaMZn CODE § 2903.04 (as amended in SUB. ILB. 511).
210 Id. § 2929.04(B) (3).
211Md. § 2901.22(D):
A person acts negligently when he fails to exercise due care to perceive or avoid a
risk that his conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature. A
person is negligent with respect to circumstances when he fails to exercise due care
to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.
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sentially a new concept to Ohio law. It is possible, however, to draw an
analogy to acts defined as crimes under present law. For example, homi-
cide by vehicle in the second degree212 criminalizes the unintentional kill-
ing of another by means of a motor vehicle. This crime, however, is lir-
ited to situations in which the offender has violated a traffic regulation
law.213 If such a law has not been violated, even a negligent killing would
not give rise to criminal penalties. On the other band, manslaughter in
the first degree is a broader crime.2 14 Violation of this statute consists of
-the "unlawful" killing of another without regard to the instrumentality
employed. An "unlawful" killing by judicial interpretation is one which
results from the violation of a statute and such violation is the proximate
cause of the victim's death.2 1 5 Under current Ohio law there is no general
provision criminalizing unintentional homicides in the absence of other
unlawful conduct. Furthermore, there is no provision under current Ohio
law, as there is in some jurisdictions, pertaining to "negligent" assault
und battery.16 Nor is there any statute which corresponds to the crimi-
nalization of negligent omissions to act. However, the absence of such a
concept has not presented any major difficulties in sanctioning negligent
conduct due to the way in which intent is handled in Ohio. Decisions such
as State v. Swiger,2117 which imposed first degree murder liability where
there was no clear intent or purpose to kill, demonstrate that negligence
may be elevated to intent whenever the court feels that an offender's act
is outrageous enough to be punished. Under decisions like Swiger, the ab-
sence of a negligence standard means very little.
The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code would impose negligence liability
"when [an actor) fails to exercise due care to perceive or avoid a risk that
his conduct may cause a certain result .... ,,2 By defining negligence in
this way, the Technical Committee has clearly indicated that an objective
rather than a subjective standard should be applied. Since there is no
requirement that an actor be aware of the risk (no guilty mind), it is
technically incorrect to classify negligence as mens rea. However, the con-
venience deriving from having all the standards for imposing liability in
2 1 2 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.18 (Page Supp. 1971).
ma In State v. Kotapisch, 171 Ohio St. 349, 171 NE.2d 505 (1960), the Ohio Supreme
Court stated that a law requiring drivers to have adequate emergency brakes was "a law . ..
applying to the ... regulation of traffic" so that the victim's death resulting from the failure
of appellant's brakes was within the purview of the statute. Id. at 352, 171 NJI.2d at 507.
2 14 01o REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Page 1954): "No person shall unlawfully kill an.
other."
215 Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N.E. 607 (1902); State v. O'Mara, 105 Ohio St,
94, 136 N.E. 885 (1922) (municipal ordinance is a "law" within the meaning of the rule).
2 16 See RL MORELAND, A RATIONALE FOR CRIMINAL NEGLIG13NCE 102.06 (1944) [here-
inafter cited as MORELAND].
217 5 Ohio St. 2d 151, 214 N.E.2d 417 (1966). See discussion accompanying note 137,
Supra.
218 PROp. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.22(D).
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one section justifies this departure from doctrinal purity. This presup-
poses that there is sufficient justification for criminalizing negligent con-
duct at all.21" Although there have been frequent and reasoned objections
to the use of negligence, the consensus of lawmakers is that it is a legiti-
mate standard. Even assuming that there is sufficient justification, a negli-
gence standard creates certain difficulties due to the fact that the term has
been used in both civil and criminal law. Therefore, it is important that
the Proposed Criminal Code clearly delineate what will constitute criminal
negligence. There has been a continuing debate in those jurisdictions
which have accepted negligence as a basis for criminal liability over whether
the same standard which is used to justify the recovery of civil damages
should be used to justify the additional imposition of criminal sanctions3'°
The Technical Committee has answered this question in the affirmative for
Ohio. Apparently, it feels that the availability of the considerable body
of case law on tort negligence and the familiarity of the courts with the
concept will significantly simplify the administration of the new criminal
law standard.221 Since negligence is a new concept to Ohio law, there is
much to be said in favor of using concepts with which the courts feel se-
cure. However, there are some other considerations which may, in the
long run, nullify the advantage so obtained.
At the outset, it must be noted that the definition of "negligence" in the
Proposed Ohio Criminal Code represents yet another striking departure
from those in other recent codes. Looking first to the Model Penal Code,
those differences are readily apparent. The Model Penal Code defines
negligence as the failure of an actor to be "aware of a substantial and un-
justifiable risk that the [prohibited harm] . ..will result from his con-
duct."1 2 The insertion of the phrase "substantial and unjustifiable" to
describe the degree of risk involved indicates that a stronger standard than
ordinary tort negligence is to be applied.2m  This conclusion is strength-
ened by the fact that the section includes a requirement that "[t)he risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it,
. . . , involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation."2' Due to the nature of ob-
jective tests, it is impossible to completely define the type of risk which is
219 See Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLum. L
REv. 632 (1963).
22o Af FosTER, CROWN Lw 264 (2d ed. 1791), first mentioned that the use of criminal
negligence was harsh.
221 Ppop. OMO CHML CODE § 2901.22(D), Committee Comments at 42: "Division (D)
is designed to define negligence, for purposes of the criminal law, in terms equivalent to
ordinary negligence as applied to the law of torts."
2 22 f.p.C. § 2.02(2)(d) (P.O.D.) (emphasis supplied).
2 23 Compare PROp. OHIO CRIN. CODE § 2901.22 (D) : "A person acts negligently when he
fails to... perceive... a risk...." See note 211 supra.
2 24 1,P.C. § 2.02(2)(d) (P.O.D.) (emphasis supplied).
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to be condemned. Any definition is at best a guide to allow a jury or court
to decide whether an actor's conduct is, in their opirion, culpable. But the
Model Penal Code definition is sufficiently dear to alert a jury that a higher
degree of culpability is needed than tort negligence, The Proposed Fed-
eral Criminal Code also emphasizes that the degree of negligence that it
would criminalize exceeds ordinary negligence. The Federal Code pro-
hibits an "unreasonable disregard of a substantial likelihood of . . . [a]
'risk [when] such disregard involv[es] a gross deviation from acceptable
standards of conduct .... "221 While this version is not as clear as that in
the Model Penal Code, there can be little doubt that it makes criminal
,negligence more than civil negligence.
Two recently enacted state criminal codes also manifest the Model Penal
Code requirement of higher culpability than tort negligence. The Illinois
Criminal Code imposes criminal sanctions for a failure to be aware of "a
substantial and unjustifiable risk ... that a [prohibited] result will follow"
when such a failure constitutes "a substantial deviation from the standard
of care which a reasonable person would exercise in [that] situation. " 2
The New York Penal Law similarly condemns "a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk" when the failure to perceive the risk constitutes a "gross devia-
tion" from the conduct of a law-abiding person.227  Thus, it can be seen
that the drafters of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code have made a sharp
and somewhat surprising departure from the pattern of other jurisdictions
without the justification of existing law.
The fact that the Ohio definition of negligence is so different from
other definitions is not of itself disastrous, unless there is a valid objection to
the use of a tort negligence standard for criminal law. In point of fact,
there are several objections which can be raised against the tort standard.
First, such a standard does not square with the historical development of
American criminal law. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the
United States which have adopted criminal negligence, have used some vari-
ation of "gross negligence" as the standard.228 This alone is not determina-
tive since there are at least five other states which have applied a tort stan-
dard." 9 The principal objection to the tort standard is that it is too
harsh?. °0 Since the trend in the development of Anglo-American criminal
law has been away from harsh treatment of criminal offenders, it seems a
regression to introduce a standard which threatens overinclusive criminal-
225 PROp. FED. CRIM. CODE § 302(1)(d).
226 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-7 (1961).
227 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (4) (McKinney 1967).
22 8 MORELAND, supra note 216, at 16-17.
•22 9 See, e.g., Haynes v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. Rep. 42, 224 S.W. 1100 (1920); State v. Gilliam,
66 S.C. 419, 45 S.E. 6 (1903); Herndon v. State, 38 Okla. Cr. 338, 261 P. 378 (1927); Cle-
mens v. State, 176 Wisc. 289, 185 N.W. 209 (1921); State v. Emery, 78 Mo. 77 (1883).
230 See FOSTER, rupra note 220, at 264.
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ization. Tort negligence does not involve a great deviation from accept-
able behavior, and even the most law-abiding citizen could easily find him-
self in violation of that standard of care. It is important to remember
that the primary policy which the law of torts serves is the compensation
of the innocent victims of another's negligence:2 Therefore, it is not un-
usual that tort law has found liability for even small lapses from the duty
of care.
Another important point is that no particular stigma is attached to a
finding of negligence. Rather, tort law seeks only that as between two
innocent people, the one who caused the injury should bear the cost of
it.132  However, when the context is shifted to that of the criminal law,
the situation changes dramatically. The imposition of criminal sanctions
involves a great deal more that the compensation of victims. Essentially,
there are two objectives which have traditionally been implemented by
the criminal law: (1) retribution for morally blameworthy conduct; and
(2) deterrence of socially disruptive behavior. 3 Since tort law does not
concern itself in any significant degree with moral blame, it is a fallacy to
lift a standard from that law and to try to convert it to one applicable to
the criminal law where blame is a basic element. t4  Conviction for a crime
involves imprisonment, disruption of one's normal life, and the potential
imposition of civil disabilities (for example, disqualification from holding
certain jobs). This is true even if the offense is only a misdemeanor.M
It can hardly compensate an injured victim to imprison the negligent ac-
tor, or even to fine him, since the money goes to the state and not to the
victim. Rather, the offender and his family are forced to endure the trauma
and disgrace that occurs whenever one is drawn into the criminal process.
Admittedly, one of the policies which tort law serves is that of deter-
rence. 6 However, that function is more important in criminal law. As
a deterrent, a tort standard of criminal negligence conflicts with traditional
criminal law philosophies. Since negligence by definition does not involve
any actual awareness on the part of the actor, it is questionable whether
the potential of criminal liability will deter conduct in any significant de-
gree because the actor is not aware that he is engaging in conduct at all
and is certainly not aware that such "conduct" might constitute a crimeY27
23  PossE, supra note 205, at 22.
232 3 W. HoLDWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 375-77 (3d ed. 1923). See aso
HOLMES, supra note 18, at 85-87.
233 See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 0 16.
24 Note, 28 Mic. L REv. 933, 934 (1930):
The requirement of "gross" negligence rather than ordinary negligence in man-
slaughter cases seems satisfactory, for criminal punishment does not often deter
ordinary negligence, and the deterrence of such negligent ats would seem to be
the only reason to support criminal punishment.
235 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2 3 6 PROSSER, supra note 205, at 23.
237 Additionally, there may be some conflict with the criminal law requirement of a
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Even accepting the premise that there is conduct which poses so serious a
threat to society that it must be penalized regardless of the actor's mental
state, a tort negligence standard is not the rational measure of such con-
duct. If the risk of harm is truly so great, then a failure to perceive that
risk would, almost by definition, constitute a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct of a law-abiding person. Thus, the more traditional
criminal negligence standard would not create any hardship for efficient
law enforcement in this area. In the case of very minor social harms, such
as littering,28 which could be established by negligence, the tort standard
of care is again inappropriate, if one remembers that the same standard
will also be applied to offenses with much larger penalties. If offenses of
this type are so minor, then this would seem to be a proper case for abso-
lute criminal liability.
It is important also to note that in most negligent crimes, the actor is
already liable to the victim civilly. If, as has been frequently maintained,
the imposition of civil damages acts as some deterrent to negligent con-
duct, it is difficult to see how that function will be enhanced by the addi-
tional possibility of criminal sanctions based on either a tort negligence
standard or a gross negligence standard. At least, any extra deterrence
coming from such penalties does not seem substantial enough to justify
the suffering which would be thrust on an offender. Perhaps, the objec-
tions to a tort negligence standard may be clarified by a comparison of two
hypothetical situations. In the first example, X is driving his car at a rea-
sonable speed. His attention is momentarily distracted by a flash of sun-
light reflected off a glass window. Mhile his eyes are away from his car's
path, a pedestrian steps from between two parked cars. X's car strikes the
pedestrian and kills him. For purposes of discussion, it will be stipulated
that had he been looking, X could have avoided the accident. In the sec-
ond case, Y is driving at an unreasonably high rate of speed around a plain-
ly marked curve. Z is also in the car with Y and the two are engaged so
deeply in animated conversation that Y does not see the curve. Y's car
enters the opposite lane where his car strikes an oncoming car and kills its
driver. As between the two situations, the conduct of Y in the second case
would strike most commentators as more culpable. It is probable that un-
der any system of negligent homicide, Y's conduct would represent a "gross
deviation" from acceptable conduct and would be punished criminally as
well as civilly. If criminalization of negligent conduct would have any de-
terrent value, it would be in cases such as Y's. Yet, under the tort stan-
dard of care, the result in both cases would be a finding of criminal negli-
voluntary act. Since a negligent person does not know that he is ' acting," it might be incon-
sistent to say that he is acting voluntarily.
238 PROp. OHIO CIUM. CODE § 2909.08:
-No person, with respect to ... litter, shall negligently:
(1) Place... it on the property of another or on public property....
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gence. In the case of X, a criminal conviction seems unduly harsh be-
cause even the most law-abiding person could find himself in X's place.
Furthermore, a finding of criminal liability would be especially strange
since there is a chance that X would not be civilly liable to his victim,
It is arguable that the pedestrian who was killed was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence and his successor in interest would be barred from collec-
tion in many jurisdictions. Under the Proposed Criminal Code, however,
there is no exculpatory provision due to the victim's contributory negli-
gence.
It could be argued that there are checks built into the system which
would serve to moderate the harshness of a rigid, tort negligence standard.
One of these checks is prosecutorial discretion. Thus, in a case where
the offender's conduct rises to the level of ordinary negligence, the prose-
cution might decide that such was not conduct flagrant enough to warrant
the imposition of criminal sanctions. Another check on the system would
be "jury nullification," which involves situations where juries refuse
to convict a defendant unless they feel that he has been grossly negli-
gent. This hesitancy to convict is said to be especially present when there
is a potential prison sentence involved. While both of these devices exist
and are undoubtedly effective limitations in some cases, a criminal law sys-
tem should not operate on such bases. First, it is doubtful that these fac-
tors would obtain equally in every case. Therefore, the defendant's guilt
would not so much depend upon what he did but on the makeup of a jury
or the idiosyncrasies of a prosecutor. Second, it is hardly conducive to the
development of sound judicial administration to evolve a body of case law
which operates by undercutting or perverting the standards of criminal law.
The fact that better results may be obtained by the simple device of using a
more rational standard to determine culpability makes it imperative that
the latter course be followed.
John F. Copes
APPENDIX
Legislative History of the A ens Rea Provisions
in the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code
1. PURPOSE
The following is the original draft proposal for the "purpose" provision
from the Legislative Service Commission to the Technical Committee dated
July 12, 1966:
(a) a person acts purposely with respect to the nature of the conduct or
the result of conduct described by the section defining an offense when
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause
such result.
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(b) a person acts purposely with respect to the attendant circumstances
of an offense when he is aware of the existence of such circumstances [or
believes or hopes that they exist].
The following represents the version of the "purpose" provision that
was introduced to the House of Representatives in HlousE BILL No. 511:
§ 2901.22(A) A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention
to cause a certain result, or, when the gravamen of the offense is a pro-
hibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the of-
fender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage
in conduct of that nature.
The following represents the version of the "purpose" provision that
were reported out of committee as SUBSTITUTE HousE BILL No. 511:
§ 2901.22(A) A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention
to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition
against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends
to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in conduct of
that nature.
2. KNOWLEDGE
The following is the original draft proposal for the "knowledge" pro-
vision from the Legislative Service Commission to the Technical Committee
dated July 12, 1966:
(a) A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of the conduct
or attendant circumstances described by the section defining an offense
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct and the attendant circum-
stances [or believes or hopes that they exist].
(b) A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct described
by the section defining the offense when he is aware that his conduct is
practically certain to [will necessarily-alternative] cause such result.
The following represents the version of the "knowledge" provision
that was introduced to the House in HousE BILL No. 511:
§ 2901.22(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when
he is consciously aware that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result
or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circum-
stances when he is consciously aware that such circumstances are likely to
exist.
The following represents the version of the "knowledge" provision that
was reported out of committee as SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL No. 511:
§ 2901.22(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when
he is aware that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely
to be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when




The following is the original draft proposal for the "recklessness" pro-
vision from the Legislative Service Commission to the Technical Committee
dated July 12, 1966:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an of-
fense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
The following represents the version of the "reckless" provision that
was introduced to the House in HousE BILL No. 511:
§ 2901.22(C) A person acts recklessly when he consciously and unjusti-
fiably disregards a substantial risk that his conduct may cause a certain re-
sult or may be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to
circumstances when he consciously and unjustifiably disregards a substantial
risk that such circumstance may exist.
The following represents the version of the "recklessness" provision
that was reported out of committee as SUBSTIUTE HOUSE BILL No. 511:
§ 2901.22(C) A person acts recklessly when with heedless indifference
to the consequences, he disregards a substantial risk that his conduct may
be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances
when with heedless indifference to the consequences, he disregards a sub-
stantial risk that such circumstance exists.
4. NEGLIGENCE
The following is the original draft proposal for the "negligence" pro-
vision from the Legislative Service Commission to the Technical Committee
dated July 12, 1966:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an of-
fense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to percieve it, con-
sidering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances
known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
The following represents the version of the "negligence" provision
that was introduced to the House in HousE BILL No. 511:
§ 2901.22(D) A person acts negligently when he fails to exercise due
care to perceive or avoid a risk that his conduct may cause a certain result
or may be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to cir-
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cumstances when he fails to exercise due care to perceive or avoid a risk
that such circumstances may exist.
The following represents the version of the "negligence" provision
that was reported out of committee as SUBSTITUTE HousE BILL No. 511:
§ 2901.22 (D) [No Change from HousE BILL No, 511].
